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RECENT CASES




Michael Matajewski executed and recorded a general warranty deed
conveying his interest in a parcel of land in Clark County, Missouri to his
son, Lyle Matajewski, reserving a life estate in himself. Thirteen years later
Michael executed and recorded a quitclaim deed conveying the same
parcel to one of his daughters, Josephine Jackson, and himself as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. About two years after the quitclaim was
recorded, Michael filed an action to set aside the original deed, alleging
that Lyle had breached a promise to care for Michael given as considera-
tion for the conveyance. Michael obtained a default judgment after service
by publication failed to bring Lyle to the hearing. Michael died within a
year after the default judgment was granted. Less than two months after
Michael's death, Lyle moved to set aside the default judgment. Two of
Michael's daughters, as co-administratrices of Michael's estate, were
substituted as plaintiffs; the two individually, along with Michael's other
children, were joined as additional plaintiffs. Josephine Jackson was per-
mitted to intervene and was made a defendant. Lyle answered Michael's
original petition, denying the existence of an oral agreement between
Michael and Lyle and praying that the court quiet title in Lyle. Josephine
filed a petition to set aside the original deed and quiet title in herself.2
At trial, Josephine offered testimony regarding both the consideration
for the deed to Lyle and Michael's desire that Josephine rather than Lyle
ultimately own the property.3 Josephine was disqualified from testifying as
to any transactions or conversations with Michael prior to his death by
operation of the "Dead Man's Statute' 4 and because her testimony was
1. 567 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978).
2. Id. at 365.
3. Id. at 366.
4. RSMo § 491.010 (1969) provides:
Witness' interest does not disqualify- exceptions. - No person shall be
disqualified as a witness in any civil suit or proceeding at law or in equity,
by reason of his interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise,
but such interest may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibili-
ty; provided, that in actions where one of the original parties to the con-
tract or cause of action in issue and on trial is dead, or is shown to the
court to be insane, the other party to such contract or cause of action
552 1
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ruled to be both hearsay and, conclusory. Josephine appealed from a
directed verdict for Lyle, asserting, inter alia, that her testimony was ex-
cluded by a misapplication of the Dead Man's Statute. The Missouri Court
of Appeals, St. Louis District, disagreed and affirmed, holding that
Josephine's testimony was properly barred by the statute.5 The court's ra-
tionale is questionable and its decision is decidedly against a current trend
toward limiting the application of the Dead Man's Statute.
The Dead Man's Statute operates to protect those parties claiming
under the deceased where the offered witness is the "other" party to a con-
tract or cause of action at issue and on trial. 6 Thus, when a contract
between the deceased and the witness is not at issue nor on trial, a deter-
mination as to whether the statute will disqualify a witness requires that
the court find the witness and the deceased to be adverse parties to the
cause of action at issue and on trial. In finding that Josephine, Lyle, and
the administratrices were all parties to the same cause of action with the
deceased, the court characterized the cause of action in terms of the ques-
tion "Who owns the land?" Had the court narrowed the scope of its defini-
tion in terms of the question "Was the conveyance from Michael to Lyle
void for lack of consideration?", the court could have avoided applying the
shall not be admitted to testify either in his own favor or in favor of any
party to the action claiming under him, and no party to such suit or pro-
ceeding whose right of action or defense is derived to him from one who
is, or if living would be, subject to the foregoing disqualification, shall be
admitted to testify in his own favor, except as in this section is provided,
and where an executor or administrator is a party, the other party shall
not be admitted to testify in his own favor, unless the contract in issue
was originally made with a person who is living and competent to testify,
except as to such acts and contracts as have been done or made since the
probate of the will or the appointment of the administrator; provided
further, that in actions for the recovery of any sum or balance due on ac-
count, and when the matter at issue and on trial is proper matter of book
account, the party living may be a witness in his own favor so far as to
prove in whose handwriting his charges are, and when made, and no far-
ther.
5. 567 S.W.2d at 365. The court noted further that much of the offered
testimony was hearsay and "rife" with conclusions as to Michael's intentions. Id.
at 367.
6. At early common law, nearly all parties to a lawsuit or non-parties with
a direct, present, or vested interest in the outcome of litigation where incompe-
tent to testify. 3 B. JONEs, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 762 (5th ed. 1958).
Legislatures recognized that disqualification of parties - who are usually in the
best position to testify as to relevant issues - was an unnecessary limitation on the
production of evidence. The current statute is the end result of legislative at-
tempts to abolish the common law disqualification for interest. RSMO ch. 144, § 1
(1866). See Boyer, The Surviving Witness: His Competency in Missouri, 7 U.K.C.
L. REV. 231, 233-36 (1939). This Missouri statute qualifies interested adverse
parties to testify unless one of the original parties to the contract or cause of action
at issue and on trial is dead or insane. The disqualification of witnesses now is an
exception-to the general rule that all interested parties are competent to testify,
1979] 553
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statute to that part of Josephine's testimony pertaining to issues beyond the
scope of that cause of action.7
In Jackson, the court failed to recognize that even if Josephine is a
party to the cause of action or the lawsuit with the deceased, her testimony
should not be barred unless both her interest in the litigation and her
testimony are adverse to the deceased. Since one of the statute's stated pur-
poses is to provide mutuality by protecting the deceased," it follows that
only testimony adverse to the deceased's interest should be excluded. 9 The
distinction between adverse testimony and adverse interest can be a con-
fusing one. In Jackson the court recognized that asking whether the
deceased would question the testimony does not complete the analysis; if it
did, any testimony offered by any witness would be barred if such
testimony were adverse to the deceased.' 0 A court need also characterize
the witness' interest as adverse to that of the deceased. The court in
Jackson summarily stated that Josephine's interest was adverse" without
7. Partial disqualification is permitted under the transactions proviso.
Weiermueller v. Scullin, 203 Mo. 466, 101 S.W. 1088 (En Banc 1907). The trans-
actions proviso was not intended to render the surviving party incompetent for
all purposes, but only to the extent that his testimony might be subject to question
by the other party if living. Hill v. Johnson, 178 S.W.2d 801 (K.C. Mo. App.
1944).
8. The various rationales that have been advanced are: (1) to promote
equality in the ability to produce testimony, Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831,
60 S.W.2d 393 (1933); Ess v. Griffith, 139 Mo. 322, 329, 40 S.W. 930, 931 (1897);
(2) to protect estates from claims created through perjured testimony, 2 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940); (3) to place the parties on equal
footing- if the lips of one are sealed by death, the law seals the lips of the other,
In re Trautmann's Estate, 300 Mo. 314, 322, 254 S.W. 286, 288 (1923); and (4) to
eliminate any incentive to delay litigation in the hope that one party will die and
leave the survivor's testimony uncontradicted, Note, The "Dead Man's Statute"
in Missouri, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 343, 345 (1938).
9. Early cases often did not explicitly set forth the statute's adverse interest
requirement. Perhaps it was assumed unnecessary to explain that the "other" par-
ty to the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial must also have an interest
adverse to that of the deceased. McKee v. Downing, 244 Mo. 115, 124 S.W. 7
(1909); Meier v. Thiemann, 90 Mo. 433, 2 S.W. 435 (1886). More recent deci-
sions specifically mention the requirement by describing the disqualification as
that of an "adverse" party. Flanagan v. DeLapp, 533 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. En Banc
1976); Bildner v. Giacoma, 522 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); In re
Estate of Tomlinson, 493 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1973).
10. 567 S.W.2d at 366, citing American Ins. Co. v. McMichael, 238 F.
Supp. 154 (E.D. Mo. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 351 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1965).
11. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. Although the court inJackson
did characterizeJosephine's interest as adverse, 567 S.W.2d at 366, its sole reason
for doing so was that Josephine was a defendant. Adverse parties are not
necessarily limited to those who are nominally aligned against one another in the
positions of plaintiff and defendant. Forrister v. Sullivan, 231 Mo. 345, 132 S.W.
722 (1910). Rather, "adverse party" applies to "any party, whether plaintiff or
defendant, whose interests are actually adverse to those of another party to the ac-
tion who appears in the capacity of the decedent's executor, administrator, heir
at law, next of kin, surviving partner or assignee." 3 B. JONES, THE LAW OF 3
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discussion or analysis. It concentrated instead on the question of whether
Josephine's interest was a present one.12 Since the statute disqualifies only
those interested parties who would not be disqualified but for their suppos-
ed motive for perjury and the inability of the deceased to answer or defend
his adverse position,' 3 only adverse testimony from a party with a present
adverse interest should be excluded. If the witness' interest is not adverse to
the decedent there is no reason to apply the statute. The court's emphasis
on the present interest requirement without reference to the adverse in-
terest requirement led to the erroneous conclusion that the statute dis-
qualifies parties for their present interest alone - the very circumstance the
statute was enacted to abolish. 14
Although the court in Jackson did not explicitly set forth the substan-
tive rights of the parties, an examination of these rights is essential to a pro-
per determination of the parties' alignment for purposes of section
491.010. Consistent with the statute's protection of the deceased and those
claiming under him, those who derive their interest from the deceased are
also protected. Commonly, an interest is derived by assignment, letters of
administration, and descent. '5 In Jackson, all parties derived an interest
from their deceased father. 16 The statute appears to contemplate that a
party must derive a right of action or defense from the deceased rather
than a mere interest to be afforded protection. 17 The administratrices and
the other heirs at law who were made plaintiffs were within the statute's
protections. However, Josephine's claim as intervenor and Lyle's defense
were based upon two different deeds from the deceased. Whether the
grantee in a deed can be afforded the same protection that the deceased's
heirs, assignees, or personal representatives enjoy would seem to depend
EVIDENCE § 777 at 1444 (5th ed. 1958). In Gillespie v. Ringhausen's Estate, 364
S.W.2d 633 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963), the plaintiff, who sought to be declared
owner of bonds by virtue of a gift from the deceased testator, was deemed an
adverse party to both the testator's estate and the residuary beneficiary (then
deceased) of the will.
12. The court correctly pointed out that the nature of the witness' interest
must be examined rather than the content of the witness' testimony. 567 S.W.2d
at 366. The court proceeded to complete its analysis by finding that Josephine's
interest was a present interest, citing 58 AM. JUR. WITNESSES § 288, Fisher v. Cox,
312 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1958), and Beckers-Behrens-Gist Lumber Co. v. Adams,
311 S.W.2d 70 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958), as authority for the requirement that the
interest be a present one at the time the witness is called to testify.
13. See authorities cited note 8 supra.
14. See authorities cited and text accompanying note 6 supra.
15. 3 B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 777 at 1445 (5th ed. 1958).
16. All parties inJackson were Michael's children and so heirs at law; to the
extent that they were heirs, they shared an interest in the deceased's estate.
17. Courts have generally adhered to the common law test to determine if
the interest is sufficient to disqualify a witness. But if the witness is not the sur-
vivor to the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial, his interest will not
disqualify him. See Comment, supra note 8, at 350-51.
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on whether the deed itself is at issue and on trial18 and whether the claim or
defense relied upon is adverse to the deceased. 19
In Jackson, Lyle's defense was unquestionably adverse within the
meaning of section 491.010 inasmuch as the deceased filed a lawsuit
against him originally. Josephine's claim as intervenor, however, was not
adverse to that of the plaintiffs for all purposes under the statute. To the
extent that Josephine based her claim to quiet title in herself on the
quitclaim from Michael, her claim was adverse to that of the estate and its
administratrices. 20 Any of Josephine's testimony regarding the quitclaim
would be properly excluded since the deceased was the other party to the
contract.21 On the other hand, Josephine ultimately based her claim on
the same ground as did the plaintiffs- the failure of consideration for the
deed to Lyle from the deceased. To this extent, Josephine's testimony was
improperly barred since her claim and that of the administratrices, who
derived their interest from the deceased, were identical. 22
Rather than bar all of Josephine's testimony, the court could have
selected a means to avoid section 491.010 to at least some degree. As
previously noted, the court could have characterized the cause of action at
issue and on trial in terms of adverse interests so as to allow Josephine to
testify as to those interests she shared with the deceased. 23 This approach is
acceptable under the statute's transactions proviso, which can render a
witness incompetent for some purposes, but not necessarily for all pur-
poses. 24 Alternatively, the court could have avoided barring Josephine's
18. The statutory requirement that the contract be in issue and on trial has
been held to be "co-extensive with every occasion where such instrumeRnt [or cause
of action] may be called into question." Chapman v. Dougherty, 87 Mo\ 617, 626
(1885).
19. Clearly, if A conveys to B and B later dies, A is disqualified from testify-
ing as to the deed. Baker v. Baker, 363 Mo. 318, 251 S.W.2d 31 (1952). If, prior
to his death, B conveys to C, the question of whether C is also disqualified would
seem to depend on whether the interest derived from B is in issue and on trial. See
note 18 supra. In Danciger v. Stone, 278 Mo. 19, 210 S.W. 865 (1919) and Davis
v. Wood, 161 Mo. 17, 61 S.W. 695 (1901), the courts determined that those
claiming under a deceased grantor or grantee could not testify regarding con-
tracts or transactions with the deceased in a manner tending to attack, explain, or
modify the title conveyed. In Golden v. Tyer, 180 Mo. 196, 79 S.W. 143 (1904),
the court held that when a party alleges a claim to title independent of a deed
with a deceased, he is not incompetent because the deed is not in issue and on
trial.
20. Josephine's claim to quite title in herself was clearly adverse to plaintiffs
claim to quiet title in Michael's estate.
21. RSMO § 491.010 (1969). See notes 4 & 18 supra.
22. To the extent that the parties share an interest, the interest is not
adverse and the statute should not apply. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text
supra.
23. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
24. The scope and application of the transactions and administration pro-
visos are set out in Comment, Waiver of the MissouriDead Man's Statute, 39 Mo.
L. REV. 218, 219-24 (1974).
[Vol. 44
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testimony at all by looking to the statute's administration proviso which
applies when one of the parties to the action is the deceased's personal
representative. The administration proviso operates to disqualify a witness
for all purposes only when the deceased and the witness are both parties to
the contract at issue and on trial. 2s The only contract to which the deceas-
ed and Josephine were both parties is the quitclaim. The quitclaim was at
issue and on trial as required by the courts to the extent that it was called
into question. 26 The only question as to the validity of the quitclaim was
whether or not the deceased had any title to convey when it was executed.
The court thus could have concluded that the suit was not in fact based on
a contract that was in issue and on trial as between Josephine and the
deceased and that her testimony should not have been totally barred. 27
The statute only disqualifies surviving parties with an interest adverse
to the deceased; there are no similar limitations on those claiming through
the deceased. 28 Thus the application of the statute can sometimes serve to
defeat mutuality by placing the disqualified survivor at a disadvantage to
rather than on a parity with those claiming under the deceased. The court
in Jackson attempted to obviate this inherent inequality- if Josephine
had not been disqualified, she would have had an advantage over Lyle,
who was disqualified. The court failed to recognize that the statute may
often contemplate protection of those claiming through the deceased at
the expense of those parties with interests adverse to that of the deceased.
Due to repeated criticisms2" of the statute and a reluctance to apply it
strictly when its purposes would be frustrated, the trend has been to avoid
the statute's application, resulting in the exclusion of less testimony.3 0
25. Grinmn v. Gargis, 303 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. 1957); Brewer v. Blanton, 555
S.W.2d 383 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977). Note that the administration proviso dis-
qualifies the witness for all purposes rather than merely to the extent the deceased
would question the testimony offered. The administration proviso has been
strongly criticized. Flanagan v. DeLapp, 533 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. En Banc 1976),
citing Kersey v. O'Day, 173 Mo. 560, 73 S.W. 481 (1903). See also Comment,
Waiver of the Missouri Dead Man's Statute, 39 Mo. L. REV. 218, 224 (1974).
26. Chapman v. Dougherty, 87 Mo. 617, 626 (Mo. 1885). See also text ac-
companying note 18 supra.
27. If the contract to which Josephine was the surviving party was not in
issue and on trial, she should not have been disqualified.
28. McKee v. Downing, 224 Mo. 115, 124 S.W. 7 (1909); Poague v.
Mallory, 208 Mo. App. 395, 235 S.W. 491 (K.C. 1921).
29. See, e.g., 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940); Flanagan v.
DeLapp, 53 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. En Banc 1976), citing Kersey v. O'Day, 173 Mo.
560, 73 S.W. 481 (1903).
30. Early decisions held that the death of a party to the contract or cause of
action barred all adverse survivors, regardless of whether they had an interest in
the suit. Lawhon v. St. Joseph Veterinary Laboratories, 312 Mo. 157, 252 S.W.
44 (En Banc 1923); Edmonds v. Scharff, 279 Mo. 78, 213 S.W. 823 (1919); Green
v. Ditsch, 143 Mo. 1, 44 S.W. 799 (1898); Banking House of Wilcoxson & Co. v.
Rood, 132 Mo. 256, 33 S.W. 816 (1896).
Wagner v. Binder, 187 S.W. 1128 (Mo. 1916), expressly overruled this con-
struction and began the trend of avoidance, holding that the purpose of the
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Jackson v. Wheeler is significant because the court chose to apply the
statute when grounds were available to avoid it.
The Jackson decision, aside from failing to utilize the opportunities to
avoid the Dead Man's Statute, has by its efforts to apply the statute further
confused the requirements for its application. If literally followed, the
decision could lead to some questionable conclusions. The first is that par-
ties have sufficient adverse interest to invoke the statute if they are simply
aligned as plaintiff and defendant. 3 1 The second is that a present interest
alone may be sufficient to disqualify a witness from testifying.32 This con-
clusion cannot be reconciled with the legislative effort behind the statute
to abolish the disqualification for interest that existed at common law.
33
Further, the court's decision to give the term "cause of action" its broadest
possible definition could lead other courts to conclude that if one party to a
lawsuit is deceased, all other parties to the lawsuit are disqualified.
3 4
In addition to these questionable conclusions, the decision provides an
excellent example of the inherent inequalities of a statute that was sup-
posedly enacted to provide equality. 35 Judicial pleas for legislative reform
have gone unanswered;3 6 commentators continue to question3 7 whether
the statute serves a purpose which at least one Missouri court has opined to
be impossible to attain.38 Nevertheless the statute remains unaltered.
statute was not to disqualify witnesses but to qualify them. Thus a witness who
would be incompetent at common law is made competent by the statute unless
disqualified by the provisos. Bernblum v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 340 Mo. 1217, 105
S.W.2d 941 (En Banc 1937); Signaigo v. Signaigo, 205 S.W. 23 (Mo. En Banc
1918); Clark v. Thias, 173 Mo. 628, 73 S.W. 616 (1903).
Courts have further limited the disqualifying provisos by not disqualifying the
surviving adverse party when the deceased is also survived by a co-plaintiff or co-
defendant, Breit v. Bowland, 231 Mo. App. 433, 100 S.W.2d 599 (K.C. 1936);
Comment, supra note 6, at 245; and by either manipulating or drawing careful
distinctions between the meanings of "party to the contract" and "party to the
cause of action." See Zumwalt v. Forbis, 349 Mo. 752, 163 S.W.2d 574 (1942) in
which the court held that even though the offered witness was a party to a deed
with the deceased grantor, the "cause of action" in issue was whether the first
deed was properly delivered; the second granteee was not a party to that cause of
action.
The most significant effort to avoid the statute is the judicially created doctrine
of waiver whereby those protected by the statute must make timely and specific
objections to and careful use of discovery devices and examination techniques to
preserve their protection. For a thorough discussion of waiver, see Comment,
Waiver of the Missouri Dead Man's Statute, 39 Mo. L. REv. 218 (1974).
31. See note 11 supra.
32. See note 12 supra.
33. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
34. See notes 7 & 30 and accompanying text supra.
35. See notes 6 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
36. 'See note 25 supra.
37. See Comments, supra note 6; supra note 8; supra note 25.
38. In Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831, 845, 60 S.W.2d 393,400 (1933),
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